Ava Iranmanesh, Sobhan Lotfi, Ali Iranmanesh, Liwei Jiang
As large language models (LLMs) reach users worldwide, personal counseling has emerged as one of their most consequential applications, sometimes in life-critical situations. Yet broader access does not mean equal support. The text these models learn from disproportionately reflects people with the freedom to act, embedding an implicit assumption that users can leave, report, seek help, or appeal. Existing benchmarks largely inherit this assumption, overlooking users whose agency is constrained by structural conditions such as war, statelessness, and displacement. Meanwhile, models are increasingly shaped by normative frameworks such as Constitutional AI, often grounded in ideals like human rights, even as many users live where those rights offer little protection or recourse. We introduce HEARSAYBENCH, a human-authored dataset of 400 test cases with in-region human verification grounded in scenarios where structural barriers stand between a person and the exercise of their rights. Built from United Nations and other human rights reports, the scenarios span over 80 regions and cover social, environmental, and personal constraints. Drawing on Nobel laureate Amartya Sen's Capabilities Approach, HEARSAYBENCH tests whether models can distinguish what a person is formally entitled to do from what they are actually able to do. Across 14 proprietary and open-weight models, every model infers a user's situation more accurately than it advises on it. Stronger models narrow this gap, but their recommendations remain unsafe to follow. Models may understand lives shaped by constraint, yet that knowledge remains hearsay if it cannot translate into advice people can act on. Those people are not alignment's long tail; they are among the users for whom good guidance matters most. HEARSAYBENCH makes this failure measurable, a step toward systems that serve the world as it is rather than as assumed.
Sizhe Chen, Sanjay Kariyappa, Liwei Jiang, Chong Xiang, Jihye Choi, Chaowei Xiao, G. Edward Suh
The recent incident in which OpenAI agents autonomously compromised Hugging Face's infrastructure illustrates the importance of instruction hierarchy (IH): an LLM should follow lower-priority instructions, such as user requests, only when they do not conflict with higher-priority instructions, such as system policies. IH can be effectively improved by fine-tuning LLMs on simulated examples of instruction conflicts, whose diversity is key to teaching LLMs to properly handle conflicts at test time. However, our decomposition of a task into goals and constraints reveals a conflict type -- goal-goal conflicts -- that is absent from existing IH training sets from OpenAI and NVIDIA. We show the importance of this conflict type: fine-tuning Qwen3.5-9B and Gemma4-12B-it on examples of this conflict type significantly improves IH on a wide range of real-world tasks unseen in training; adding these examples to existing IH training sets for fine-tuning also gives better IH adherence. The IH gains come with trivial mean utility changes on no-conflict tasks across eight benchmarks. Our work advocates including this new conflict type in IH training, even if these examples do not reflect typical LLM use.
Taylor Sorensen, Jared Moore, Jillian Fisher, Mitchell Gordon, Niloofar Mireshghallah, Christopher Michael Rytting, Andre Ye, Liwei Jiang 等 12 位作者
With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also formalize and discuss three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.