As people turn to LLMs for social advice, understanding their behavior in such contexts becomes essential. In this work, we focus on behavioral dispositions: the underlying tendencies that shape responses in social contexts. We introduce STAR, a framework for studying how closely the dispositions expressed by LLMs align with those of humans. STAR builds on established psychological questionnaires, adapting their items into realistic advice-seeking scenarios, as self-report may not transfer to actual advisory behavior. Using STAR, we construct a dataset of 23k scenarios, each validated by 3 raters and annotated with preferences from 10 participants. Across 25 LLMs, we find that (1) when human consensus is high, frontier models can fail to reflect it in 15-20% of cases, and smaller models fail at substantially higher rates; (2) when humans disagree, LLM recommendations are substantially less diverse than human choices, both within individual models and even across models from different providers, potentially narrowing the range of options users are guided toward; (3) LLMs' self-reported values are poor predictors of their recommendations. To support future research we make our dataset and code publicly available.
Nitay Calderon, Eyal Ben-David, Zorik Gekhman, Eran Ofek, Gal Yona
Standard factuality evaluations of LLMs treat all errors alike, obscuring whether failures arise from missing knowledge (empty shelves) or from limited access to encoded facts (lost keys). We propose a behavioral framework that profiles factual knowledge at the level of facts rather than questions, characterizing each fact by whether it is encoded, and then by how accessible it is: cannot be recalled, can be directly recalled, or can only be recalled with inference-time computation (thinking). To support such profiling, we introduce WikiProfile, a new benchmark constructed via an automated pipeline with a prompted LLM grounded in web search. Across 4 million responses from 13 LLMs, we find that encoding is nearly saturated in frontier models on our benchmark, with GPT-5 and Gemini-3 encoding 95--98% of facts. However, recall remains a major bottleneck: many errors previously attributed to missing knowledge instead stem from failures to access it. These failures are systematic and disproportionately affect long-tail facts and reverse questions. Finally, we show that thinking improves recall and can recover a substantial fraction of failures, indicating that future gains may rely less on scaling and more on methods that improve how models utilize what they already encode.
Zorik Gekhman, Roee Aharoni, Eran Ofek, Mor Geva, Roi Reichart, Jonathan Herzig
While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.
Zorik Gekhman, Eyal Ben David, Hadas Orgad, Eran Ofek, Yonatan Belinkov, Idan Szpektor, Jonathan Herzig, Roi Reichart
This work presents a framework for assessing whether large language models (LLMs) encode more factual knowledge in their parameters than what they express in their outputs. While a few studies hint at this possibility, none has clearly defined or demonstrated this phenomenon. We first propose a formal definition of knowledge, quantifying it for a given question as the fraction of correct-incorrect answer pairs where the correct one is ranked higher. This gives rise to external and internal knowledge, depending on the information used to score individual answer candidates: either the model's observable token-level probabilities or its intermediate computations. Hidden knowledge arises when internal knowledge exceeds external knowledge. We then present a case study, applying this framework to three popular open-weights LLMs in a closed-book QA setup. Our results indicate that: (1) LLMs consistently encode more factual knowledge internally than what they express externally, with an average relative gap of 40%. (2) Surprisingly, some knowledge is so deeply hidden that a model can internally know an answer perfectly, yet fail to generate it even once, despite large-scale repeated sampling of 1,000 answers. This reveals fundamental limitations in the generation capabilities of LLMs, which (3) put a practical constraint on scaling test-time compute via repeated answer sampling in closed-book QA: significant performance improvements remain inaccessible because some answers are practically never sampled, yet if they were, we would be guaranteed to rank them first.