Strategic Repayment and Latent Fragility in Financial Networks: Why Banks Withhold Payable Liquidity
Hicham El Kaissi
原文摘要
A network in which every bank pays in full can nevertheless admit a self-fulfilling settlement freeze under the same balance-sheet fundamentals. Thus, observing full repayment does not establish the uniqueness or robustness of the payment equilibrium. We derive this result from a precautionary-liquidity choice: banks may delay otherwise feasible payments to insure an interim funding need, trading a positive settlement-discipline cost against the marginal value of retained cash. The optimal reserve is a critical quantile of future liquidity requirements, and the repayment rule nests Eisenberg-Noe maximal feasible clearing exactly. Counterparty underpayment both reduces current cash and raises desired reserves. We characterise network amplification and the conditions for coexistence, including a homogeneous two-bank GPD frontier in which interbank exposure and maximum funding pass-through enter through one dimensionless index. A two-date settlement accounting rule distinguishes payment timing from ultimate default. The main result concerns equilibrium coexistence; the conditional best-response adjustment diagnostic does not assign selection probabilities.
q-fin.RM · cs.GT · econ.TH · q-fin.MF