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arXiv:2611.21262 · v1

Strategic Repayment and Latent Fragility in Financial Networks: Why Banks Withhold Payable Liquidity

首次提交 2026-11-16 23:34
版本更新 2026-11-16 23:34
雷达观测 2026-11-17 16:10
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摘要

A network in which every bank pays in full can nevertheless admit a self-fulfilling settlement freeze under the same balance-sheet fundamentals. Thus, observing full repayment does not establish the uniqueness or robustness of the payment equilibrium. We derive this result from a precautionary-liquidity choice: banks may delay otherwise feasible payments to insure an interim funding need, trading a positive settlement-discipline cost against the marginal value of retained cash. The optimal reserve is a critical quantile of future liquidity requirements, and the repayment rule nests Eisenberg-Noe maximal feasible clearing exactly. Counterparty underpayment both reduces current cash and raises desired reserves. We characterise network amplification and the conditions for coexistence, including a homogeneous two-bank GPD frontier in which interbank exposure and maximum funding pass-through enter through one dimensionless index. A two-date settlement accounting rule distinguishes payment timing from ultimate default. The main result concerns equilibrium coexistence; the conditional best-response adjustment diagnostic does not assign selection probabilities.

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v1 · 2026-11-16 23:34 · 最新观测版本

Strategic Repayment and Latent Fragility in Financial Networks: Why Banks Withhold Payable Liquidity

A network in which every bank pays in full can nevertheless admit a self-fulfilling settlement freeze under the same balance-sheet fundamentals. Thus, observing full repayment does not establish the uniqueness or robustness of the payment equilibrium. We derive this result from a precautionary-liquidity choice: banks may delay otherwise feasible payments to insure an interim funding need, trading a positive settlement-discipline cost against the marginal value of retained cash. The optimal reserve is a critical quantile of future liquidity requirements, and the repayment rule nests Eisenberg-Noe maximal feasible clearing exactly. Counterparty underpayment both reduces current cash and raises desired reserves. We characterise network amplification and the conditions for coexistence, including a homogeneous two-bank GPD frontier in which interbank exposure and maximum funding pass-through enter through one dimensionless index. A two-date settlement accounting rule distinguishes payment timing from ultimate default. The main result concerns equilibrium coexistence; the conditional best-response adjustment diagnostic does not assign selection probabilities.

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