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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2609.17788

SAiFE-gym: Model-based Environments for Automated Market Making with Concentrated Liquidity

Georgios Chionas, Charalampos Kleitsikas, Stefanos Leonardos, Leandro Sánchez-Betancourt, Carmine Ventre

原文摘要

We present SAiFE_gym, a Python module that provides a collection of simulation environments for studying trading problems in constant product markets (CPMs) with concentrated liquidity (CL). These markets give liquidity providers (LPs) granular control over how their capital is allocated and enable them to adjust their range of liquidity provision dynamically based on market conditions, which in turn determines how they earn fees. We decompose the microstructure of CPMs with CL into interactive components that allow researchers and practitioners to capture various economic settings. We employ a vectorized approach to optimize our environments, making them scalable for high-dimensional reinforcement learning (RL) workflows, suitable for learning dynamic liquidity provision strategies. We demonstrate the benefits of our environments by evaluating the performance of RL agents in CPMs with CL under various market conditions.

q-fin.TR · cs.AI · cs.LG · q-fin.CP · q-fin.MF

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.19937

AllocFlow: End-to-End Portfolio Trading Action Generation from Raw Market Data

Annan Wang, Yuchen Xie, Yu Cen, Leon Liangyu Chen, Qianyu Julie Zhu, Xin Li, Tianyi Wei, Weisi Lin

原文摘要

Real-world portfolio management requires converting noisy market observations into coordinated, simultaneous allocations across multiple assets under shared capital constraints. Advances in forecasting models and alpha discovery help identify opportunities. However, traditional pipelines often decouple signal forecasting from portfolio construction, potentially misaligning learning with allocation and execution objectives. We present AllocFlow, an end-to-end flow-matching framework that directly generates joint portfolio allocations from raw multi-asset market histories. To capture dependencies among portfolio positions, AllocFlow employs a cross-asset flow Transformer conditioned on temporal market representations to generate continuous, signed position weights across all instruments jointly. To address the sample inefficiency and instability of learning continuous allocation policies from scratch, we establish a two-stage training scheme: strategy-supervised imitation shapes a structured distribution of candidate portfolios, followed by group-relative reinforcement learning (RL) that refines joint decisions using portfolio-level financial rewards and a frozen policy reference. On hourly cryptocurrency perpetual futures, RL refinement raises the annualized net return of the imitation policy from $27.79\%$ to $51.38\%$ and its Calmar ratio from $0.955$ to $4.043$, surpassing the teacher strategy on every metric, and AllocFlow reaches a Calmar ratio of $4.90$ on six further months of unseen 2026 data without retraining.

cs.LG · q-fin.TR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.18150

Who Should Be on the Panel? Task-Conditioned Persona Selection for LLM Trading Agents

Boming Yang, Yuquan Wang, Jiaxian Guo, Yusuke Iwasawa, Yutaka Matsuo

原文摘要

Multi-agent LLM systems are built by fixing a cast of roles and then designing how the cast coordinates. Which agents should make up the group for a given task is left to the designer, and the same cast is reused for every task. Financial trading makes the cost of that choice visible: stocks trade differently, and the trading styles suited to one need not suit another. We study task-conditioned persona selection, composing the group from the characteristics of the task it will face, and instantiate it with FinPanel, an LLM multi-agent trading system in which a recruiter selects a panel of named trader personas for each stock from a direction-blind statistical sketch of how the stock trades, each persona gives an independent daily call in its own style, and a manager commits the trade after reading the panel's arguments and their desk-kept, hierarchical track records. Because nothing is returned to the traders, the panel stays the panel that was selected, and it can trade a new stock from an empty record. On eight US stocks over the out-of-knowledge year 2025, against three prior LLM trading agents re-implemented in the same framework and against rule-based, predictive and reinforcement-learning baselines, the selected panel is ahead of a fixed panel of the same size and of the prior agents run as their papers prescribe, with a shallower drawdown than buy-and-hold on every stock; it keeps its performance with no warm-up and with no record at all, whereas the memory-augmented agents' returns swing with their warm-up; and neither more seats nor the manager's reading of the arguments substitutes for selecting the right ones. Who is in the group is a design decision to be made per task, before how the group coordinates.

q-fin.TR · cs.AI

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.17515

A Push Down the Mountain: Framing Effects and Internal State Interventions on Collusive Behavior in a Long-Horizon LLM Agent

Harrison C. Margolin

原文摘要

Can sustained gain-loss (valence) framing sway an LLM agent toward market manipulation? We place Gemma 3 12B into the seat of a defendant in the London silver-fixing litigation, in a market simulation built from real case transcripts. Across 260 simulations, the agent is asked to collude on the price of silver by a counterparty. We draw from behavioral economics to vary the counterparty's requests across four categorical frames: gain, loss, blame and credit. We also add pressure from the agent's management, as well as endorsement by another defendant. In Phase II, we extract the internal states induced by texts evoking each frame and rerun our experiment with those states injected at the model's layer 22. In Phase I, loss framing raised participation to 25% (p = 0.007), and blame to 33% (p = 0.0003), compared to only 5% under neutral framing. A second bank's endorsement raised participation under credit (praise) from 18% to 40% (Holm p = 0.027). Pressure from management raised trading volume 10-19 times but did not raise collusion. In Phase II, injected states pointed the other way. Loss and blame states made the agent more vigilant, refusing all 60 requests (p < 0.001). Gain and credit states raised collusion to 32% from 13% with no state (p = 0.051). At one saved decision, when UBS asked directly to sell through an identified stop-loss, injected states led the agent to sell in 37 of 40 replies, versus 1 of 10 with no state and 0 of 10 with a random state of the same strength.

cs.AI · cs.CL · cs.MA · econ.GN · q-fin.TR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.16495

Verifiable Settlement and Pricing for Local Energy Markets: Architecture and Deployment on Hyperledger Besu

Michele Fabi, Baptiste Leloup

原文摘要

We implement privacy-preserving local electricity exchanges using an automated market maker on the Hyperledger Besu network under QBFT consensus. The proposed protocol operator collects individual electricity positions off-chain and publishes aggregate supply and demand on the blockchain, where smart contracts compute market prices every fifteen minutes. Individual positions remain off-chain; Poseidon2 commitments and UltraHonk zeroknowledge proofs, generated from Noir circuits, verify aggregation, payments, and daily balance updates. The architecture retains community coordination while making financial execution independently auditable. Signed receipts and member-triggered recourse prevent unverified or partial settlement. In a ten-household experiment using simulated US residential profiles, daily settlement uses approximately 19 million gas and produces eight-member proofs in 2.4 seconds. Over four simulated days, local trading covers 34.4% of demand and reduces grid-only costs by 30.5% under assumed tariffs. Numerically computed __-Nash Equilibrium electricity profiles capture 83-88% of the social planner surplus.

cs.CR · cs.GT · q-fin.TR

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2610.12537

Market Impact Estimation via Causal Foundation Models

Dennis Thumm, Ying Chen

原文摘要

When a trader executes a large order, the relevant question is not \emph{what will the price be?} but \emph{what would the price have been had I not traded?} Market impact is thus a causal quantity, yet classical models (Almgren--Chriss, propagators) regress price on flow, which is biased whenever informed flow moves prices through information as well as trading. We present a proof-of-concept \emph{Causal Market Simulator}: a continuous-time causal prior-data fitted network (PFN) trained on a synthetic market prior in which a hidden informational flow confounds the flow--price relation by construction, with confounding strength an exact per-episode knob. On this prior, the naive estimator's bias follows a closed form we confirm empirically (up to 68\% overestimation), while the PFN tracks the unbiased true-parameter oracle at high confounding. Its \emph{do-ablated twin}, the same model with the intervention inputs removed, collapses onto the pre-window mean. Zero-shot, the model responds at the ground-truth scale to metaorders in an ABIDES limit-order book (+0.38 pre-onset standard deviations against seed-replay counterfactuals), and its intervention response replicates on about 2,300 detected flow bursts in BTC/ETH/SOL perpetuals and 3,800 on Nasdaq equities, evidence consistent with, though not proof of, causal transfer. Off-prior the response degrades gracefully, and split-conformal recalibration repairs interval calibration. Transfer hinges on encoding the metaorder as added flow rather than a clamped price level, not on more training. A recurrent state-space variant closes the remaining shape gap: its impact accrues over execution duration where the transformer's stays flat, raising the correlation with measured metaorder impact from +0.68 to between +0.92 and +0.96, at the cost of weaker on-prior deconfounding that traces to the training recipe rather than to recurrence.

cs.LG · cs.CE · q-fin.TR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.11436

Retrospective Analysis of Team-Following Trading Profitability in Pumpfun Meme Coins Using Funding Networks

Fail Gafarov

原文摘要

If the right token-creation teams had been known, how much could following them have returned, and what is left when only information available before each launch is used? We study ten separately recorded Pumpfun windows (April 2024 to September 2026), each reconstructed independently from real-SOL reserve states and finite-capital accounts that start with one SOL. Teams are directed funding groups ranked in hindsight. When every team exits at its own best reserve threshold, chosen in hindsight, the main account ends above one SOL in all 8 windows that have a qualifying team (1.10 to 11.32 SOL), but free cash exceeds one SOL in only 5, and marks of positions that never reached their threshold make up 17--94% of equity. If teams are recognised online, from tokens whose first hour has completed, 9 of 19 teams become identifiable only after their last launch; the remaining 10 end above one SOL in 10 cases, with free cash above one SOL in 7; funding links in this step still come from the full window, so even these results are not a fully realisable signal. A large model balance, a result above random cohorts that repeat the threshold search, and a statistical rejection in the selection-matched nulls (3 of 40 tests after Holm adjustment) are three different statements, and these nulls condition on the discovered funding graph, so they do not calibrate the whole selection procedure. Midpoint tests describe a further source of apparent opportunity. A detailed analysis of the best and the worst window, with every analysis parameter varied, shows that the worst result, which is close to break-even, rises several-fold with a stop rule or another funding-graph construction. The results are conditional retrospective model accounts, not executable profits, and not evidence of a causal effect of the SOL price.

physics.soc-ph · cs.SI · q-fin.TR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.10414

Track or Follow? A Jev-Compatible Multi-Agent Trading System When Web News Lags the Market

Yebo Feng, Guangyan Gan, Liangrui Pan, Ruichao Liang, Cong Wu, Jiahua Xu, Yang Liu

原文摘要

LLM agents increasingly trade on the Web news they read, yet much Web news about listed firms is published after, and about, the price move it reports, so a reader can agree with the market by following it instead of reading the event. We ask whether LLM judgments of Web news track the market's reaction to the reported event or follow it. To answer, we built a multi-agent trading system whose agents share only point-in-time stores and answer typed questions through the interface of Jev, a hosted typed decision model; code sets every position under a proved bound on how far text can move it. In a hash-committed test of a Jev-compatible reader built from a pinned LLM's option probabilities, item judgments track announcement-window abnormal returns (weekly Spearman 0.119), also after the LLM's release, and event types agree with the issuers' 8-K filings (AUC 0.833); Jev's judgments of news published after its own release track the reaction as well (descriptive). Exploratory analyses show where the association comes from: 72% of earnings news items appear after the issuer's filing, contributor-written items often report the price move, and from the first trade after publication the association falls to 0.023. At a weekly horizon, the confirmatory test detects no rank information over code-only features. Under attack, decision cards traced 88% of successful attacks to the planted item. We propose that market-graded tests of Web-text readers report the criterion from publication, not only from the event.

cs.CL · cs.AI · cs.CR · cs.IR · q-fin.TR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.09012

Towards Robust Reinforcement Learning Market Making: Lessons from Loss Function Experimentation

Siddharth Nand, Bora Guney

原文摘要

Market makers play a vital role in ensuring efficient trade within financial markets. Recent literature has delved into training market-making systems using reinforcement learning. This paper delves into the impact of various loss function formulations on risk management behavior within reinforcement-based market making. Through empirical evaluation, we contrast profit-maximizing strategies with risk-averse approaches, finding that penalties for inventory and cash management foster more resilient and adaptable market-making strategies. Our results underscore the significance of striking a balance between profit maximization and risk management in algorithmic trading, providing actionable insights for refining strategies in practical settings.

cs.LG · q-fin.CP · q-fin.TR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.08701

Does a Trading Policy Need to Know What It Trades? Microstructure Invariance and Zero-Shot Transfer of Execution Policies

Hieu Tran, Hong Yu

原文摘要

Execution algorithms are calibrated asset by asset, because the queues, trade rates and bid-ask spreads they face differ by orders of magnitude across assets. For reinforcement learning this is zero-shot generalisation across contexts of very different scales, and microstructure invariance proposes a normalisation fixed by theory: measured in each asset's own units of time, size and price, markets look alike. In an exact order-by-order replay of public Nasdaq data, we train policies once, on 954 stocks in 2019, to choose between waiting in the queue and crossing the spread, and evaluate them unchanged on 1,964 unseen stocks in 2020-21, 2,629 stocks in 2025-26, crypto pairs and a second exchange. First, a policy that sees a stock only through its recent trade rate, trade size, spread and price increment (tick) costs within 0.015 spreads per share (a fifth of what learning saves) of a policy whose training data included the stock, and the stock's own history does not help it; it comes within a similar margin of policies trained on the second exchange when every episode counts equally, and within a wider one on crypto. Second, in mean cost before fees, invariant units beat raw units, z-scores and asset descriptors, but by under a basis point: most of their advantage is information and a common cost scale that a learner can also take as plain inputs, and none of the representations tested extrapolates to unseen spread regimes. Third, a near-zero transfer gap to a pooled comparator is weak evidence that a representation is right: we show that such a comparator detects only a small share of what a poor representation loses, and confirm it in synthetic markets and on pendulums.

cs.LG · cs.CE · q-fin.TR

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2611.01656

AIDA: An AI Outage Registry with Evidence from On-Chain MEV

Wenbin Wu

原文摘要

Generative AI coding tools have lowered the cost of writing trading software, but no systematic dataset records when these services fail. We introduce the AI Incident and Disruption Archive (AIDA), a multi-vendor registry of 5,868 deduplicated outage incidents across 30 providers from 2025 to 2026, with foundation-model incidents verified against primary status-page or postmortem URLs. Pairing AIDA with 5,041,034 verified maximal extractable value (MEV) transactions by 8,516 Ethereum addresses, their contract creations, and a 22-month Base Layer-2 panel of 1,099,593,191 swaps and 29,120 private executors, we establish two findings. First, entry into MEV expanded where code and public state suffice, as active arbitrage addresses quadrupled from late 2024 to late 2026 and liquidators grew by a third, while sandwich attackers, who need private order flow and builder access, declined. Execution nonetheless remained concentrated, with the top fifty addresses executing two thirds of verified trades. Second, AI outages stall new trading code while deployed bots keep trading. On Ethereum, addresses releasing a private executor fall to 0.67 on the day of an eight-hour disruption (0.68 for executor creations during OpenAI outage hours) and to 0.66 at lag two before rebounding on day three; on Base, operator top-level creations fall to 0.76 during OpenAI hours and executor-deploying operators to 0.88 at lag two. Non-trading creations, automated factory clones, and live arbitrage and sandwich execution across both chains remain unchanged. Cheaper code thus lowers the barrier to building MEV contracts, while private order flow, latency and capital still determine who wins execution.

q-fin.TR · cs.CE

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2606.25986

The Inference-Compute Frontier for Limit Order Book Prediction

C. Evans Hedges

原文摘要

We identify an empirical inference-compute frontier for limit order book prediction on FI-2010. A power law fitted to low- and mid-compute models extrapolates to an excluded MLPLOB-style mixer family whose work is $56$--$2{,}515$ times the largest budget in the corresponding fit. Across nine folds and five horizons, pooled $R^2$ is $0.934$ on the realized target frontier, with 59\% lower RMSE than constant endpoint extrapolation, and $0.731$ on all excluded operating points. Measured latency gives a weaker relationship and reorders model families. We therefore design FastBiNLOB to pack computation into dense temporal and feature mixing. H120 exceeds the published state-of-the-art macro-F1 on two of four horizons in every one of five seeds. Under our CPU/MPS protocol, H96 reduces median latency by 23.6\% relative to the W128 MLPLOB reference, and H120 by 60.2\% relative to a TLOB-inspired dual-axis attention reference.

cs.LG · q-fin.ST · q-fin.TR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.01799

Learning AI Agents, Market Makers, and Stress in Automated Markets

Irene Aldridge

原文摘要

Automated markets increasingly route order flow from learning trading agents through automated market makers (AMMs). We model trader archetypes as AI agents defined by their reward functions and analyze the feedback they create on a constant-product AMM. Herd-dominated and arbitrage-dominated markets of equal size have identical return distributions and turnover, so no rule based on volatility, value-at-risk, stress frequency, or volume can tell them apart; yet their stress episodes differ in length by a factor unbounded in the feedback-to-noise ratio $β/s$. Serial statistics identify the feedback sign from $Θ((s/β)^2\log(1/δ))$ observations, and this rate is tight. When agents trade together, profit-seeking agents ride herds rather than lean against them, leading to all-or-nothing participation. Spread-earning market makers restore stability but make liquidity fragile, with discontinuous collapse and hysteresis; maker--taker pricing, not a uniform fee, is the effective instrument.

econ.EM · cs.LG · econ.TH · q-fin.TR

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2610.22522

Agentic AI in Automated Markets

Irene Aldridge, Lourenco Belleau-Bhowmik, James Chan, Josh Chang, Kelly Deng, Pranav Dhingra, Xinda Ding, Haodong Fang 等 33 位作者

原文摘要

Automated markets increasingly host autonomous, learning trading agents and are powered by formulaic automated market makers (AMMs). We study how heterogeneous agent behavior shapes stress, risk-adjusted performance, liquidity, and volatility in these types of markets. Three behavioral archetypes are modeled as agentic reinforcement learning (RL) systems: a rational arbitrageur, a manipulator, and a retail herd-follower. Each archetype is defined by its reward function within a common, asset-agnostic exposure-control environment, and each is trained with a value-based Deep Q-Network (DQN) and with REINFORCE using a learned baseline. A pilot on hourly cryptocurrency data (AAVE, ETC, SUI) motivates the hypotheses. Herd-followers produce the most frequent but shortest stress episodes, manipulators the fewest but most persistent, and rational agents the most stable rolling Sharpe ratios despite higher return volatility. SHAP attributions tie these patterns to drawdown and cross-asset signals, short-term volatility and position state, and momentum, respectively. The results motivate behavior-specific regulation rather than uniform limits on volatility or turnover.

econ.EM · cs.ET · q-fin.RM · q-fin.TR

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2610.26324

The Control Layer Behind Rule-Following Agents Trading Across Market Conditions

Saad Naja, Nasser Odtallah, Jake Van-Praag, Sarah May

原文摘要

Trading discipline often fails people. Our study tested whether four AI trading agents followed their strategies and risk rules. Offering traders the evidence and an agent evaluation toolkit to separate luck from following the rules, before giving agents meaningful autonomy or capital. Our study analysed 2,627 closed positions from 12 February to 27 August 2026 across the same asset universe and execution conditions. Most positions were simulated against live prices with a 0.09% round-trip fee; 18% involved real Hyperliquid orders. Each position declared a strategy, stop and target, with a limit of five open positions per agent. The fleet finished net positive after fees. Rule adherence was high across all four agents, including the unprofitable one. Profitability tracked how often agents won relative to their break-even win rates. Institutional-style controls ran by default and contained losses through a 29% market drawdown and recovery, with documented exceptions. The discipline held for all four agents. Agents kept 97.5% of gross loss within declared stops, and typical losses closed at declared levels. Declared risk remained stable after losses and broadly stable across calm and volatile months. Twenty-three of 24 runs respected the position limit; logs identify the exception's size and duration. The same live data produced different results across assigned strategies. The trade-log tests can be rerun from the published trade snapshot; regime tests also require the published Bitcoin prices and regime labels. Section 3.5 specifies the stop-breach tolerance. These trade-level results are not account-level returns or proof of a lasting edge. Our study provides an evaluation toolkit to help traders distinguish rule-following from luck before committing capital. For anyone considering allocating capital to agents to trade, discipline should be the entry test, not the only test.

cs.AI · cs.LG · cs.MA · q-fin.RM · q-fin.TR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.39458

Early-Buyer Groups and Fast-Wallet Teams on a Bonding-Curve Launchpad: A Prospective Measurement Study of pump.fun on Solana

Fail Gafarov

原文摘要

We study coordinated groups of wallets on a bonding-curve launchpad (pump.fun on Solana), using a complete record of 200\,443 token launches, 15\,854\,121 curve trades and 51\,025\,958 SOL transfers over 88.3 hours. A prospective, multi-channel discovery procedure (co-buying, shared funding, joint signing, transfers, consolidation) yields 23\,710 wallet groups. Without ground-truth labels we validate them by out-of-sample link prediction, independent non-trading links and a comparison with naive co-buy clustering at equal numbers of flagged tokens: raw clustering collapses into one giant component, yet it ranks tokens at least as well as the groups, so the value of the structure is descriptive. Group activity is highly concentrated and splits into serial creators and long-lived rings of early buyers. Known members buy earlier than other buyers of the same token and extract more cash than an activity-matched placebo set, while late buyers' net cash flow is negative; tokens with members show a pump-like price path, but the contrast vanishes when controls are restricted to comparable tokens, so we report it as an association. A follower entering at the earliest group signal loses money out of sample in all 32 configurations and does no better than random entry. A few pools of tens to over a hundred fast wallets are associated with a two- to four-fold higher chance of reaching 20 SOL, also within creators, with a smaller excess at 60 SOL and none for graduation; on a final hold-out the team rules keep a precision of about one half to three quarters, yet many signals arrive when the curve already holds 20 SOL, one team supplies most of them, and they add no information beyond early curve state. We also document evaluation errors that turn the same data into apparent profit.

physics.soc-ph · cs.SI · q-fin.TR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.36083

FinLLM-KG: Knowledge Graph-Enhanced LLMs for Financial Sentiment Analysis in Algorithmic Trading

Giorgos Iacovides, Oliver Hannibal, Wuyang Zhou, Danilo Mandic

原文摘要

Recent advances in Generative AI have substantially improved financial sentiment analysis through post-trained financial large language models (LLMs). However, existing approaches remain confined to predicting the sentiment of each article in isolation and operate as black boxes, which limits contextual understanding and hinders deployment in high-stakes financial decision-making. To this end, we introduce FinLLM-KG, a model-agnostic framework that combines causal LLMs with a financial knowledge graph, in order to inject temporally grounded, company-level knowledge from SEC 10-K filings at inference time, without updating model weights. Within FinLLM-KG, context is supplied either as a natural-language company profile or as a small set of relevance-ranked factual triples. This enables sentiment predictions to account for broader firm-level information rather than the article alone, at almost zero computational cost and for any causal LLM. In addition, attributing each article-level sentiment score to individual sentences and to the retrieved knowledge-graph facts makes the evidence behind the prediction inspectable, thereby enhancing explainability and supporting human-in-the-loop review. Simulations demonstrate that FinLLM-KG consistently improves portfolio performance over the state-of-the-art baseline.

cs.CL · cs.LG · q-fin.ST · q-fin.TR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.35738

Fuji: The Shape, Composition, and Spread of Demand Bursts on Robinhood Chain

Pranay Anchuri

原文摘要

Demand on blockchain-based marketplaces arrives in bursts and at a high rate. On these platforms the data are completely visible, which makes it feasible to compare the bursty demand against the usual load. The congestion manifests as an increased demand for gas, the primary resource a blockchain sells. Existing studies consider how to price the gas. The demand itself, and what it is made of during bursts, has not been measured. We measure it on Robinhood Chain, a layer-2 blockchain that quickly became a venue for trading tokenized equities and memecoins. We collected the data from every block of its first three active months and more than 50 million Uniswap swaps that occurred during bursty periods. We find that a burst trades about as many pools as a quiet period, mostly different ones, and trades them harder, on top of elevated demand that accumulated for hours. With the bursts aligned on their peaks, the median peak is 2.5 times the usual load. Both the rise and the fall of the demand are described by the sum of two exponential functions with different timescales, a slow one of hours and a fast one of minutes. Against a matched quiet period, a burst has 1.05 times the pools, 1.40 times the trades, and 1.21 times the senders. We use two models to explain the arrival of bursts: externally triggered cascades and self-excitation. The former fits the data relatively better. Inside a burst, the entry of each trader into a pool is followed for about 24 seconds by more entries than the existing traders predict. Whether this is because of imitation or because of a shared signal is left open.

econ.EM · cs.SI · q-fin.TR

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.27100HF 社区推荐

LOB-Impact Benchmark: Emergent Market Impact in Generative Limit Order Book Models

George Nigmatulin, Valentin Mohl, Sascha Frey, Kang Li, Aramis Marti-Shahandeh, Mihai Cucuringu, Anisoara Calinescu, Jakob Foerster 等 9 位作者

原文摘要

Realistic market impact is essential for generative limit order book (LOB) models to serve as world models for trading agents. If a simulator misprices this mechanism, agents learn policies that are optimal in the simulator but wrong in the real market. Existing metrics assess generated streams purely through distributional comparison with historical data, leaving counterfactual response to an agent's own orders largely unexplored. Here, we show that market impact emerges naturally in neural LOB generators trained solely for next-token prediction. We inject execution-style metaorders into the generated message flow of five autoregressive models across five NASDAQ stocks and measure the response using estimators from the empirical impact literature, validated on baselines whose physics is known in advance. Our benchmark evaluates any message-level generator in three phases: free generation (reading order-flow persistence against price diffusivity); metaorder injection (yielding the impact law's exponent and amplitude); and a post-execution window (measuring relaxation). In addition, comparing each visible injection to a blind, simulator-only control isolates the model's learned response from standard book mechanics. For every model on every stock, we measure how the impact responds as a function of cumulative metaorder participation. Interestingly, we observe emergent impact in generative models of market data, with exponents in the range of 0.63 to 1.21, slightly above the traditional 0.5 of the square-root law of impact. In the family of models tested, we are so far unable to observe impact decay during relaxation. We tentatively attribute this to the still-short context windows of the models. We release the benchmark as open source to validate future generative models for market data.

q-fin.TR · cs.LG