← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.17515 · v1
A Push Down the Mountain: Framing Effects and Internal State Interventions on Collusive Behavior in a Long-Horizon LLM Agent
首次提交 2026-11-13 05:09
版本更新 2026-11-13 05:09
雷达观测 2026-11-17 04:58
摘要
Can sustained gain-loss (valence) framing sway an LLM agent toward market manipulation? We place Gemma 3 12B into the seat of a defendant in the London silver-fixing litigation, in a market simulation built from real case transcripts. Across 260 simulations, the agent is asked to collude on the price of silver by a counterparty. We draw from behavioral economics to vary the counterparty's requests across four categorical frames: gain, loss, blame and credit. We also add pressure from the agent's management, as well as endorsement by another defendant. In Phase II, we extract the internal states induced by texts evoking each frame and rerun our experiment with those states injected at the model's layer 22. In Phase I, loss framing raised participation to 25% (p = 0.007), and blame to 33% (p = 0.0003), compared to only 5% under neutral framing. A second bank's endorsement raised participation under credit (praise) from 18% to 40% (Holm p = 0.027). Pressure from management raised trading volume 10-19 times but did not raise collusion. In Phase II, injected states pointed the other way. Loss and blame states made the agent more vigilant, refusing all 60 requests (p < 0.001). Gain and credit states raised collusion to 32% from 13% with no state (p = 0.051). At one saved decision, when UBS asked directly to sell through an identified stop-loss, injected states led the agent to sell in 37 of 40 replies, versus 1 of 10 with no state and 0 of 10 with a random state of the same strength.
作者备注:38 pages, 9 figures, 30 tables. Project page: https://harrisonm23-byte.github.io/push-down-the-mountain/
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v1 · 2026-11-13 05:09 · 最新观测版本
A Push Down the Mountain: Framing Effects and Internal State Interventions on Collusive Behavior in a Long-Horizon LLM Agent
Can sustained gain-loss (valence) framing sway an LLM agent toward market manipulation? We place Gemma 3 12B into the seat of a defendant in the London silver-fixing litigation, in a market simulation built from real case transcripts. Across 260 simulations, the agent is asked to collude on the price of silver by a counterparty. We draw from behavioral economics to vary the counterparty's requests across four categorical frames: gain, loss, blame and credit. We also add pressure from the agent's management, as well as endorsement by another defendant. In Phase II, we extract the internal states induced by texts evoking each frame and rerun our experiment with those states injected at the model's layer 22. In Phase I, loss framing raised participation to 25% (p = 0.007), and blame to 33% (p = 0.0003), compared to only 5% under neutral framing. A second bank's endorsement raised participation under credit (praise) from 18% to 40% (Holm p = 0.027). Pressure from management raised trading volume 10-19 times but did not raise collusion. In Phase II, injected states pointed the other way. Loss and blame states made the agent more vigilant, refusing all 60 requests (p < 0.001). Gain and credit states raised collusion to 32% from 13% with no state (p = 0.051). At one saved decision, when UBS asked directly to sell through an identified stop-loss, injected states led the agent to sell in 37 of 40 replies, versus 1 of 10 with no state and 0 of 10 with a random state of the same strength.
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