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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.25011

Near-Quadratic Sample Compression for All VC Classes

Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Shay Moran, Grigoris Velegkas, Di Wang 等 9 位作者

原文摘要

The sample compression conjecture is a longstanding open problem in learning theory, originating in the work of Littlestone and Warmuth in the 1980s. At its heart is a connection between simplification and generalization: if a predictor consistent with a training sample is defined using only a small part of that sample, then it is likely to generalize. Sample compression schemes formalize this idea, and many natural learning algorithms can be analyzed this way. The sample compression conjecture of Floyd and Warmuth (1995) asserts that every binary concept class of VC dimension $d$ admits a sample compression scheme of size $O(d)$; a weaker conjecture asks only for size polynomial in $d$. Both have remained open: the first bound depending only on $d$, due to Moran and Yehudayoff (2016), is exponential in $d$. We prove the weaker conjecture by constructing a sample compression scheme of size $O(d^2 \log^2 d)$.

cs.LG · cs.AI · cs.DS · math.CO · stat.ML

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.17313

面向上下文归因的语言模型草图算法

Sketching Language Models for Context Attribution

Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Grigoris Velegkas, Felix Zhou

AI 速读 基于摘要

该论文研究如何用远少于 n 次的模型评估来估计语言模型的留一法上下文归因值,并给出匹配的上下界与初步实证。

cs.DS · cs.AI · cs.LG · stat.ML

查看原文摘要

Context attribution asks how removing parts of a prompt changes a language model's output. We study leave-one-out (LOO) attribution for a prompt of $n$ tokens and a fixed measurement function. Computing all LOO values directly requires $n$ model evaluations. Under a stability assumption, our algorithm estimates all LOO values to error proportional to $\varepsilon$ with constant probability using $O(\sqrt{\log(1/\varepsilon)}/\varepsilon)$ evaluation calls. To complement our upper bound, we prove a matching $Ω(\sqrt{\log(1/\varepsilon)}/\varepsilon)$ lower bound on the number of evaluation calls in an oracle model. Empirically, we verify coefficient decay consistent with stability and evaluate the performance of our sketching algorithm on a small language-model retrieval task. Technically, our result is based on a sketching algorithm for arithmetic circuits whose Taylor coefficients satisfy the stability condition recently introduced by Gunn [Gun26]. A direct adaptation of their forward differentiation sketches would require $\widetilde{O}(\log(n)/\varepsilon^2)$ evaluation calls. Our key observation is that we can apply forward differentiation to the backpropagation circuit, with only constant overhead over a forward sketch of the same Taylor degree. This reduces the variance of the sketches and is key to our improved evaluation bound. Our lower bound builds on the techniques of Amsel, Chen, Duman Keles, Halikias, Musco, and Musco [ACDH+26, SIAM Journal on Matrix Analysis and Applications] for lower bounding the number of matrix-vector queries to estimate the diagonal elements of random matrices.

版本更新 · v3arXiv:2609.27304

The Power of Recruiting the Smaller Side: Two Additional Traders Suffice in Two-Sided Markets

Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Grigoris Velegkas, Di Wang, Mingfei Zhao

原文摘要

We study Bulow-Klemperer-style competition complexity in two-sided double auctions with $m$ unit-demand buyers drawn i.i.d. from $F_B$ and $n$ unit-supply sellers drawn i.i.d. from $F_S$. When $m \ge n$ and buyer valuations first-order stochastically dominate seller costs ($F_B \succeq_{\mathrm{FSD}} F_S$), we prove that recruiting just two additional sellers enables Seller Trade Reduction (STR), a prior-independent mechanism, to achieve expected Gains From Trade (GFT) at least the first-best GFT of the original market; symmetrically, when $m \le n$, Buyer Trade Reduction suffices with two additional buyers. This resolves open questions of Babaioff, Goldner, and Gonczarowski (SODA 2020) and Cai, Liaw, Mehta, and Zhao (STOC 2024). Moreover, this uniform bound is optimal: already for $m = n = 1$, no prior-independent mechanism (deterministic or randomized) that is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC), individually rational (IR), and weakly budget-balanced (WBB) matches the first-best GFT with one additional seller. We further extend our characterization to $r$-dominance ($F_B \succeq_r F_S$), where $r \in (0, 1]$ and $1 - F_B(x) \ge r(1 - F_S(x))$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R}$ (recovering $F_B \succeq_{\mathrm{FSD}} F_S$ at $r = 1$). When $m \ge n \ge 1$, $c = \lceil 1/r \rceil + 1$ additional sellers suffice for STR to match or exceed the first-best GFT, while every prior-independent DSIC, IR, and WBB mechanism requires at least $\max(2, \lceil 1/r \rceil - 1)$ additional sellers even for $m = n = 1$, pinning down the optimal bound to within two traders. Finally, this $Θ(1/r)$ bound cannot be asymptotically improved even by recruiting on both sides: for $r < 1/64$ and $m = n = \lceil 2/(5r) \rceil$, every prior-independent DSIC, IR, and WBB mechanism requires $c \ge \lceil 1/(64r) \rceil = Ω(1/r)$ additional traders per side.

cs.GT

新论文 · v1arXiv:2603.08679Google DeepMind

A New Lower Bound for the Random Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade using AI-Guided Evolutionary Search

Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Zun Li, Aranyak Mehta

原文摘要

The celebrated Myerson--Satterthwaite theorem shows that in bilateral trade, no mechanism can be simultaneously fully efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC), and budget balanced (BB). This naturally raises the question of how closely the gains from trade (GFT) achievable by a BIC and BB mechanism can approximate the first-best (fully efficient) benchmark. The optimal BIC and BB mechanism is typically complex and highly distribution-dependent, making it difficult to characterize directly. Consequently, much of the literature analyzes simpler mechanisms such as the Random-Offerer (RO) mechanism and establishes constant-factor guarantees relative to the first-best GFT. An important open question concerns the worst-case performance of the RO mechanism relative to first-best (FB) efficiency. While it was originally hypothesized that the approximation ratio $\frac{\text{GFT}_{\text{FB}}}{\text{GFT}_{\text{RO}}}$ is bounded by $2$, recent work provided counterexamples to this conjecture: Cai et al. proved that the ratio can be strictly larger than $2$, and Babaioff et al. exhibited an explicit example with ratio approximately $2.02$. In this work, we employ AlphaEvolve, an AI-guided evolutionary search framework, to explore the space of value distributions. We identify a new worst-case instance that yields an improved lower bound of $\frac{\text{GFT}_{\text{FB}}}{\text{GFT}_{\text{RO}}} \ge \textbf{2.0749}$. This establishes a new lower bound on the worst-case performance of the Random-Offerer mechanism, demonstrating a wider efficiency gap than previously known.

cs.LG · cs.AI · cs.GT · econ.TH

新论文 · v1arXiv:2502.20346Google Research

Equilibria and Learning in Modular Marketplaces

Kshipra Bhawalkar, Jeff Dean, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Neel Patel

原文摘要

We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given budget. This paper studies the market design problem in such an ecosystem, where module owners strategically set prices for their APIs (to maximize their profit) and a central platform orchestrates the aggregation of module outputs at query-time. One can also think about this as a first-price procurement auction with budgets. The first observation is that if the platform's algorithm is to find the optimal set of modules then this could result in a poor outcome, in the sense that there are price equilibria which provide arbitrarily low value for the user. We show that under a suitable version of the "bang-per-buck" algorithm for the knapsack problem, an $\varepsilon$-approximate equilibrium always exists, for any arbitrary $\varepsilon > 0$. Further, our first main result shows that with this algorithm any such equilibrium provides a constant approximation to the optimal value that the buyer could get under various constraints including (i) a budget constraint and (ii) a budget and a matroid constraint. Finally, we demonstrate that these efficient equilibria can be learned through decentralized price adjustments by module owners using no-regret learning algorithms.

cs.GT