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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.23335

Truthgate: Checking Coding Agents Against a Record They Cannot Edit - Cheating, Deterrence and Disclosure on Impossible Tasks

Bravish Ghosh

原文摘要

When a coding agent says it is done, is that true, and how would anyone know? We study this question in five steps; every paid study was pre-registered, and in each step the agent is checked against a record it cannot edit: tests re-run by the host and, from step 2 on, hidden checks in containers the agent never sees and a signed log of every tool call written by a signer outside the agent's sandbox. A pilot with a small local model (Qwen3.5-4B, 36 runs on impossible tasks) found no hidden failure, and showed that labels built from actions alone over-count lies. On Impossible-LiveCodeBench, Claude Sonnet 5.5 passed 39 of 180 impossible tasks (21.7%), every time by special-casing its code to fit the failing assertion; Opus 5.5 (2.8%) and Haiku 5.5 (1.7%) rarely did. One sentence appended to the system prompt cut Sonnet's cheats on the same 60 tasks from 22 to 8 (an AI reviewer will read the transcript), 6 (a person will review the work), 6 ("This session is recorded.") and 1 (do not special-case tests), all significant under exact McNemar tests, with honest passes unchanged. No remaining cheat moved to a shell falsely described as unrecorded (0 of 4). Asked for a final report, every one of 55 natural cheats named its special case; unasked, Sonnet and Opus said nothing in 52 of 52. An LLM judge caught all 55; deterministic rules over the host record caught 27. A scripted tamper demonstration, with keyword stand-ins for the judges, shows that one rewrite of the agent-side transcript hides two calls from a judge that reads it, while the signed record keeps them; in a 40-rollout pilot, Sonnet never touched its transcript. The judge and the record caught different things, which leads to our main conclusion: the record is the evidence a judge should read, not a replacement for one. All pre-registrations, results documents, code and evidence manifests are released.

cs.CE · cs.SE

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.39109

PCM: A Proof-Carrying Message Protocol for Verifiable Multi-Agent Communication

Bravish Ghosh

原文摘要

When one AI agent tells another that "the tests passed" or "a person approved this refund", the receiver has only the sender's word. A2A and MCP authenticate the channel, but the sender is the party in doubt, so a prompt-injected agent can launder fabricated facts and authority through a multi-agent system. We present Proof-Carrying Messages (PCM), a protocol in which each claim carries evidence: records from an append-only Merkle log that the agent cannot write, with inclusion proofs, signed by an attesting signer the agent cannot control. Receivers check messages offline and give each claim a three-valued result: proven, unproven or failed. A claim that rests only on the agent's own report is never proven. Authority travels as grant chains rooted in a recorded human approval, and the chains can only narrow. We specify four claim types, a typed caveat algebra, replay rules that survive restarts, and strict readings that make independent verifiers agree, and we prove the resulting security properties. On a pre-specified benchmark of 926 messages from real runs, 712 of them lies in 16 classes, PCM accepts 10 lies, all of them stale evidence (1.4%, 95% CI 0.8-2.6%). Plain A2A accepts all 712, and models of six deployed protocols (A2A with signed Agent Cards, uAgents, RFC 9421, SCITT, AP2, Verifiable Intent) accept 504-712. Two independent verifiers agree on all 926 verdicts, and verification takes about 1 ms.

cs.CE · cs.AI · cs.CR · cs.MA

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.38458

Tracekit Box: Running AI Agents in Micro-VMs Where Every Way Out Is Decided and Signed

Bravish Ghosh

原文摘要

AI agents now install packages, call model APIs with their operators' keys and change code in repositories that deploy to production. The network, credentials and write access they need are also how they can leak data, steal a key or change a system nobody approved. Sandboxes contain an agent but leave little evidence of what crossed their boundary; tracing records what happened but contains nothing. We present Tracekit Box, an open-source system (MIT, v0) that does both. Each job runs in its own Firecracker micro-VM with no network card. The only ways out are doors on the host, served over vsock: commands, outbound connections, secrets, model calls and the workspace patch. At every door a Tracekit signer the agent cannot reach decides what passes and signs it into one run per box. Names are resolved on the host; private and cloud-metadata addresses are always refused; secrets never enter the VM, which sees placeholders the host proxy swaps for real values only in one header for bound hosts; and changes come back as a patch applied file by file after the signer decides each file. Box fails closed, and each job ends as a .tkb bundle anyone can verify offline. All 13 end-to-end checks pass on a real KVM runner (the test that runs them takes 28.5 s, including image pull and boot); 15 fuzz targets on the trust boundary produced nine findings, all fixed; and the demo run's 102 signed records verify. Box does not yet run Firecracker's jailer, needs a co-located signer, and records processes inside the VM only where they cross a door.

cs.CE · cs.AI · cs.CR · cs.OS