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arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-20 08:48 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-20 19:58各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2605.07419

Incentivizing User Data Contributions for LLM Improvement under Withdrawal Rights

Di Feng, Runyuan Zhao, Chenhao Zhang, Zhanzhan Zhao

原文摘要

As large language models (LLMs) become a common source of information, users may contribute less original knowledge to the public communities on which model development depends. Platforms seeking user contributions must account for privacy and effort costs and the incentive to rely on contributions from others. We study this dilemma in a threshold public-goods model with heterogeneous user costs. Under uniform per-unit subsidies, users can be paid even when aggregate contributions fall short of the improvement threshold. To address this subsidy leakage, we develop a mechanism that combines verifiable cost disclosure, personalized contribution assignments, and voluntary withdrawal. We show that rational assignment leads either to profitable provision or to no collection. Simultaneous withdrawal minimizes contribution costs when both protocols succeed, while small-first sequential withdrawal can sustain provision under a wider range of cost conditions. Numerical experiments quantify the effects on provision probability and social welfare. In an exploratory dialogue experiment, we evaluate LLM agents based on 50 anonymized American Community Survey profiles under all three mechanisms, generating 150 trajectories to compare contribution and withdrawal decisions under matched conditions. These findings clarify how assignment rules and withdrawal timing can support collective data provision while preserving user control.

cs.GT

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2609.03681

WISE: World-model-guided Imagination Scheduling for Efficient Post-training of Vision-Language-Action Models

Chenhao Zhang, Hanyu Zhao, Zihan Que, Hang Cheng, Tengfei Pan, Long Zeng

原文摘要

Post-training VLA policies typically rely on supervised fine-tuning with costly expert demonstrations or reinforcement learning with expensive and potentially unstable real-world exploration. World models offer a promising alternative by evaluating candidate behaviors through imagined futures, yet effective post-training requires more than accurate prediction: imagination must be scheduled where it is useful, bounded within reliable horizons, and translated into trustworthy policy supervision. In robotic manipulation, the value of imagination varies substantially across execution stages, while extended rollouts can accumulate prediction errors and introduce unreliable learning signals. We introduce WISE (World-model-guided Imagination Scheduling for Efficient Post-training of Vision-Language-Action Models), a unified framework that coordinates when and how world-model imagination is used during policy refinement. WISE selectively invokes imagination at interaction-relevant states, performs bounded multi-view rollouts, evaluates candidate futures using progress and completion signals, and uses their relative outcomes to refine actions generated from real interaction contexts. Extensive experiments with both $π_0$ and $π_{0.5}$ demonstrate consistent improvements across diverse manipulation tasks while reducing GPU computation time by approximately 80% compared with full imagination. Real-world evaluations further show substantial gains in robustness and generalization under diverse real-world distribution shifts.

cs.RO

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.12232

ECOS: Environment-Calibrated On-Policy Self-Distillation for Language Agents

Chenhao Zhang, Zhongan Wang, Mingxuan Li, Hehe Fan, Zheng Zhu, Ming Li

原文摘要

On-policy self-distillation lets a language agent act as its own Teacher by conditioning on privileged context such as skills written from its own trajectories. Its guidance, however, is weighted by how much this context shifts token likelihoods rather than by whether it improves behavior, so errors in self-written skills return through later updates. We propose environment-calibrated on-policy self-distillation, which uses environmental outcomes to decide how much to trust the Teacher's current guidance and which self-written skills to reinforce. Command-level advantages, estimated by comparing commands executed at similar observations, scale each Teacher preference and reward reflections and skills whose induced preferences favor higher-advantage commands. Without skills at inference, 3B and 7B agents reach 90.5% and 93.3% macro success on seen ALFWorld tasks and 75.5% and 80.5% success on WebShop. On unseen ALFWorld tasks, they outperform GRPO under the same protocol by 11.0 and 7.6 percentage points, respectively. In an ablation study, supervising only executable commands rather than the Actor's full response raises 3B WebShop success from 52.3% to 75.0%.

cs.AI

新论文 · v1arXiv:2610.40259

The Price of a Chance in Artificial Societies

Shuqi Zhao, Boyu Wang, Shuangyue Niu, Chenhao Zhang, Zhanzhan Zhao

原文摘要

Rapid advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled autonomous agents to interact, coordinate, and pursue individual goals in artificial societies. However, our understanding of how reward structures shape their competitive behavior and collective outcomes remains incomplete. We simulate 200 LLM agents competing over 50 rounds to maximize individual wealth. We define overcompetition and lying flat as population investment above and below a Bayesian adaptive baseline, respectively. At the lowest tested reward, populations lie flat; at the two highest, they overcompete, most strongly at intermediate winner coverage. The investment committed to pursuing an uncertain reward constitutes the price of a chance. Agents near the qualification cutoff can invest heavily yet receive no prize, finishing poorer than nonwinners who invest less. Agents' stated rationales link investment decisions to perceived qualification prospects and expected returns. At the collective level, greater investment does not consistently improve ability selection. With a fixed total prize budget, offering smaller prizes to more winners can reduce investment while preserving selection quality relative to the corresponding top-ability target. Further broadening reward coverage yields additional savings but reduces selection quality. These findings show how reward design shapes overcompetition and lying flat, distributes the costs of pursuing opportunity, and influences what competition collectively achieves.

cs.CY