Samira Mirbagher Ajorpaz, Daniel Moghimi, Jeffrey Neal Collins, Gilles Pokam, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh, Dean Tullsen
原文摘要
This paper provides an end-to-end solution to defend against known microarchitectural attacks such as speculative execution attacks, fault-injection attacks, covert and side channel attacks, and unknown or evasive versions of these attacks. Current defenses are attack specific and can have unacceptably high performance overhead. We propose an approach that reduces the overhead of state-of-art defenses by over 95%, by applying defenses only when attacks are detected. Many current proposed mitigations are not practical for deployment; for example, InvisiSpec has 27% overhead and Fencing has 74% overhead while protecting against only Spectre attacks. Other mitigations carry similar performance penalties. We reduce the overhead for InvisiSpec to 1.26% and for Fencing to 3.45% offering performance and security for not only spectre attacks but other known transient attacks as well, including the dangerous class of LVI and Rowhammer attacks, as well as covering a large set of future evasive and zero-day attacks. Critical to our approach is an accurate detector that is not fooled by evasive attacks and that can generalize to novel zero-day attacks. We use a novel Generative framework, Evasion Vaccination (EVAX) for training ML models and engineering new security-centric performance counters. EVAX significantly increases sensitivity to detect and classify attacks in time for mitigation to be deployed with low false positives (4 FPs in every 1M instructions in our experiments). Such performance enables efficient and timely mitigations, enabling the processor to automatically switch between performance and security as needed.
Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) based on trusted execution environments (TEEs) enable new privacy-preserving solutions. Yet, they leave side-channel leakage outside their threat model, shifting the responsibility of mitigating such attacks to developers. However, mitigations are either not generic or too slow for practical use, and developers currently lack a systematic, efficient way to measure and compare leakage across real-world deployments. In this paper, we present SNPeek, an open-source toolkit that offers configurable side-channel tracing primitives on production AMD SEV-SNP hardware and couples them with statistical and machine-learning-based analysis pipelines for automated leakage estimation. We apply SNPeek to three representative workloads that are deployed on CVMs to enhance user privacy-private information retrieval, private heavy hitters, and Wasm user-defined functions-and uncover previously unnoticed leaks, including a covert channel that exfiltrates data at 497 kbit/s. The results show that SNPeek pinpoints vulnerabilities and guides low-overhead mitigations based on oblivious memory and differential privacy, giving practitioners a practical path to deploy CVMs with meaningful confidentiality guarantees.