跳到正文
研踪PaperTrail

论文库

检索计算机领域论文,按研究方向、作者或关键词筛选。

部分采集异常
正在读取账号与研究记录…

全站更新概况

+1743新增论文
+1399其中 AI 相关
+191已有论文修订
+94新增 AI 导读

arXiv 最近完成扫描:2026-11-19 19:10 · 全站最近入库:2026-11-19 19:09各信源进度 →

统计口径与数据新鲜度

统计 2026-11-18 19:31 — 2026-11-19 19:31(北京时间) · 点击数字查看对应简报;AI 相关包含在新增论文内。

最近完成检查:2026-11-19 19:10最近发现新增版本:2026-11-19 19:09库内论文最新更新时间:2026-11-19 02:59

每分钟刷新已保存的数据。空检查不代表采集异常;新收录可能包含历史论文。AI 导读按新增版本计数。

27,982 已收录论文23,249 AI 相关8,559 有修订112 HF 社区发现

浏览论文库

时间范围跟随排序:版本更新、本站收录或首次发表。最新收录可能包含历史论文。部分信源异常,查看状态 →

找到 2 篇论文 · 按版本更新时间排序上轮扫描起点 2026-11-19 19:07(北京时间)
版本更新 · v3arXiv:2608.29497

Fair Division Under Boolean Valuations: Beyond Normalization

Nisarg Shah, Paritosh Verma

原文摘要

We study fair division of indivisible items when agents have arbitrary two-level preferences: the value of each agent for any set of items is Boolean, which need not be monotone or additive. Notably, we do not impose the standard assumption of normalization, i.e., different agents may value the empty set at different Boolean levels. Since the preferences are nonmonotone, envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) each admit several variants, depending on which items are tested for removal and whether they are removed from the envious agent's bundle or the envied agent's bundle. This paper investigates the existence of these variants of EF1 and EFX, on their own and together with economic efficiency, incentive compatibility, feasibility constraints, and lottery-based randomization. Our paper presents a wide range of positive and negative results that collectively highlight an interesting phenomenon: the landscape of achievable guarantees depends crucially on the number of normalized agents, who value the empty bundle at the lower Boolean level.

cs.GT

新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.05257

失真的计算方面

Computational Aspects of Distortion

Soroush Ebadian, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah

AI 速读 基于摘要

该论文为社会选择中的失真框架提出基于线性规划的最优随机决策算法,以及基于非凸二次规划计算随机位置评分规则精确失真的方法。

cs.GT

查看原文摘要

The distortion framework in social choice theory allows quantifying the efficiency of (randomized) selection of an alternative based on the preferences of a set of agents. We make two fundamental contributions to this framework. First, we develop a linear-programming-based algorithm for computing the optimal randomized decision on a given instance, which is simpler and faster than the state-of-the-art solutions. For practitioners who may prefer to deploy a classical decision-making rule over the aforementioned optimal rule, we develop an algorithm based on non-convex quadratic programming for computing the exact distortion of any (and the best) randomized positional scoring rule. For a small number of alternatives, we find that the exact distortion bounds are significantly better than the asymptotic upper bounds established in prior literature and lead to different recommendations on which rules to use. These results rely on a novel characterization of the instances yielding the worst distortion, which may be of independent interest.