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版本更新 · v2arXiv:2602.20398

Competition Versus Complexity in Multiple-Selection Prophet Inequalities

Eugenio Cruz-Ossa, Sebastian Perez-Salazar, Victor Verdugo

原文摘要

Competition complexity formalizes a compelling intuition: rather than refining the mechanism, how much additional competition is sufficient for a simple mechanism to compete with an optimal one? We begin the study of this question in multi-unit pricing for welfare maximization using prophet inequalities. An online decision-maker observes $m \geq k$ nonnegative values drawn independently from a known distribution, may select up to $k$ of them, and aims to maximize the expected sum of selected values. The benchmark is a prophet who observes a sequence of length $n \geq k$ and selects the $k$ largest values. We focus on the widely adopted class of single-threshold algorithms and fully characterize their $(1-\varepsilon)$-competition complexity. Notably, our results reveal a sharp competition-induced phase transition: in the absence of competition, single-threshold algorithms are fundamentally limited to a $1-1/\sqrt{2kπ}$ fraction of the prophet value, whereas even a $1\%$ multiplicative increase beyond $n$ observations suffices to achieve a $1-\exp(-Θ(k))$ fraction. Another notable result happens when $k=1$: we show that the $(1-\varepsilon)$-competition complexity is exactly $\ln(1/\varepsilon)$, fully resolving an open question by Brustle et al. [Math. Oper. Res. 2024]. Our analysis is based on infinite-dimensional linear programming and duality arguments.

cs.GT · math.OC

版本更新 · v2arXiv:2609.20797

The Strong Secretary Conjecture is True for Linear Matroids

Kristóf Bérczi, Shaddin Dughmi, Vasilis Livanos, José A. Soto, Victor Verdugo

原文摘要

We prove a $1/e$ guarantee for Matroid Secretary on linear matroids: each element of a fixed optimal basis is selected with probability at least $1/e$. This settles the strong secretary conjecture for this class of matroids. Our result holds both when the matroid is known in advance and when a linear representation is given online. In the known-matroid model, the result extends to fully modular extendable matroids. We also obtain $1/e$ guarantees for a more general model on linear matroids, both when the matroid is known and when its representation is revealed online. In XOS Matroid Secretary, agents with XOS valuations over the elements arrive in uniformly random order, and the algorithm must assign each arriving agent a bundle of elements. The bundles must be pairwise disjoint, and their union must be an independent set of the matroid. We obtain an expected total value of at least $1/e$ times the offline optimum. This model contains Group Matroid Secretary, in which the elements are adversarially partitioned into groups that arrive in uniformly random order, and the algorithm selects a subset of each arriving group. For this special case, we select each element of a fixed optimal basis with probability at least $1/e$

cs.DS