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arXiv:2602.20398 · v2

Competition Versus Complexity in Multiple-Selection Prophet Inequalities

首次提交 2026-02-24 06:22
版本更新 2026-11-09 04:50
雷达观测 2026-11-10 13:19
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摘要

Competition complexity formalizes a compelling intuition: rather than refining the mechanism, how much additional competition is sufficient for a simple mechanism to compete with an optimal one? We begin the study of this question in multi-unit pricing for welfare maximization using prophet inequalities. An online decision-maker observes m≥km \geq k nonnegative values drawn independently from a known distribution, may select up to kk of them, and aims to maximize the expected sum of selected values. The benchmark is a prophet who observes a sequence of length n≥kn \geq k and selects the kk largest values. We focus on the widely adopted class of single-threshold algorithms and fully characterize their (1−ε)(1-\varepsilon)-competition complexity. Notably, our results reveal a sharp competition-induced phase transition: in the absence of competition, single-threshold algorithms are fundamentally limited to a 1−1/2kπ1-1/\sqrt{2kπ} fraction of the prophet value, whereas even a 1%1\% multiplicative increase beyond nn observations suffices to achieve a 1−exp⁡(−Θ(k))1-\exp(-Θ(k)) fraction. Another notable result happens when k=1k=1: we show that the (1−ε)(1-\varepsilon)-competition complexity is exactly ln⁡(1/ε)\ln(1/\varepsilon), fully resolving an open question by Brustle et al. [Math. Oper. Res. 2024]. Our analysis is based on infinite-dimensional linear programming and duality arguments.

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v2 · 2026-11-09 04:50 · 最新观测版本

Competition Versus Complexity in Multiple-Selection Prophet Inequalities

Competition complexity formalizes a compelling intuition: rather than refining the mechanism, how much additional competition is sufficient for a simple mechanism to compete with an optimal one? We begin the study of this question in multi-unit pricing for welfare maximization using prophet inequalities. An online decision-maker observes m≥km \geq k nonnegative values drawn independently from a known distribution, may select up to kk of them, and aims to maximize the expected sum of selected values. The benchmark is a prophet who observes a sequence of length n≥kn \geq k and selects the kk largest values. We focus on the widely adopted class of single-threshold algorithms and fully characterize their (1−ε)(1-\varepsilon)-competition complexity. Notably, our results reveal a sharp competition-induced phase transition: in the absence of competition, single-threshold algorithms are fundamentally limited to a 1−1/2kπ1-1/\sqrt{2kπ} fraction of the prophet value, whereas even a 1%1\% multiplicative increase beyond nn observations suffices to achieve a 1−exp⁡(−Θ(k))1-\exp(-Θ(k)) fraction. Another notable result happens when k=1k=1: we show that the (1−ε)(1-\varepsilon)-competition complexity is exactly ln⁡(1/ε)\ln(1/\varepsilon), fully resolving an open question by Brustle et al. [Math. Oper. Res. 2024]. Our analysis is based on infinite-dimensional linear programming and duality arguments.

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