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新论文 · v1arXiv:2611.25470

ToolPulse: Side-Channel Eavesdropping on Tool-Using LLM Agents

Zihao Dan, Jinyu Zhang, Jinzhao Lian, Yun Chen, Shinan Liu

原文摘要

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as agents that translate user requests into sequences of local tool invocations. While prior cache-based side-channel attacks target the locally deployed models, they typically require the adversary to share model-related components or hardware resources with the victim's inference process. These assumptions do not apply to the predominant agentic settings, in which commercial LLMs execute on vendor-controlled infrastructure. We show that agentic execution exposes a more practical attack surface: although inference remains remote, tools are executed on the user's machine and commonly rely on shared system libraries. In this paper, we first systematically evaluate Flush+Reload and Prime+Probe for monitoring agentic tool invocations. Our evaluation across three hardware platforms shows that Flush+Reload enables accurate, real-time tool monitoring, whereas Prime+Probe, despite supporting cross-VM attacks, incurs prohibitive monitoring overhead and suffers from cache-set aliasing. We present ToolPulse, a cache-based side-channel eavesdropping framework against tool-using agents. We first design the Tool Recovery Attack to reconstruct an agent's tool-execution workflow. We evaluate the Tool Recovery Attack on 11 LLMs across Codex and Claude Code. It consistently reconstructs tool workflows, with the lowest F1 score exceeding 93%. We further demonstrate two attack scenarios enabled by the recovered traces. Task Profiling Attack infers user intent across two Terminal-Bench task categories and the Trigger Localization Attack identifies sensitive tool calls in encryption/decryption and model training/inference workloads. Even under substantial system noise on a server shared by approximately 20 users, both Task Profiling Attack and Trigger Localization Attack maintain high accuracy.

cs.CR · cs.AR