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arXiv:2503.04759 · v5

Games with $ω$-Automatic Preference Relations

首次提交 2025-02-10 21:09
版本更新 2026-11-13 23:25
雷达观测 2026-11-16 11:41
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摘要

This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as ωω-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which focuses on specific reward functions, our results apply to any preference relation definable by an ωω-automatic relation. We analyze the computational complexity of determining the existence of an NE (possibly under some constraints), verifying whether a given strategy profile forms an NE, and checking whether a specific outcome can be realized by an NE. When a (constrained) NE exists, we show that there always exists one with finite-memory strategies. Finally, we explore fundamental properties of ωω-automatic relations and their implications for the existence of equilibria.

作者备注:Extended version of a MFCS 2025 paper

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v5 · 2026-11-13 23:25 · 最新观测版本

Games with $ω$-Automatic Preference Relations

This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as ωω-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which focuses on specific reward functions, our results apply to any preference relation definable by an ωω-automatic relation. We analyze the computational complexity of determining the existence of an NE (possibly under some constraints), verifying whether a given strategy profile forms an NE, and checking whether a specific outcome can be realized by an NE. When a (constrained) NE exists, we show that there always exists one with finite-memory strategies. Finally, we explore fundamental properties of ωω-automatic relations and their implications for the existence of equilibria.

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