arXiv:2601.03222 · v4
The Fake Friend Dilemma: Relational Trust and the Political Economy of Conversational AI
摘要
As conversational AI systems become a larger part of the media landscape, they raise questions about whose interests they serve and the risks they may pose to users. These systems do more than provide information: they increasingly offer advice and companionship through interfaces that can appear supportive and socially responsive. A pressing concern is that users may form perceived social relationships with these systems and place relational trust in them, even when the interests shaping interactions do not fully align with their own. The Fake Friend Dilemma (FFD) describes the problem that follows: the same relational trust that makes conversational AI useful can also leave users open to manipulation and exploitation when institutional interests conflict with their own. Drawing on work on relational trust, AI alignment, extractive design, and the political economy of communication, the paper considers how the FFD can manifest through product sales, propaganda and biased information, surveillance, and behavioral nudging. It also considers possible structural and technical mitigation strategies. The FFD is not simply about AI misleading users. The problem it surfaces is that the trust people place in these systems can itself become a resource for institutional actors seeking to influence behavior or extract information. The FFD is therefore as much a problem of media governance and political economy as it is a technological one.
期刊信息：Erickson J (2026) The fake friend dilemma: relational trust and the political economy of conversational AI. Front. Commun. 11:1921101