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arXiv:2608.29497 · v2

Fair Division Under Boolean Valuations: Beyond Normalization

首次提交 2026-08-30 09:27
版本更新 2026-11-17 06:49
雷达观测 2026-11-18 19:43
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摘要

We study fair division of indivisible items when agents have arbitrary two-level preferences: the value of each agent for any set of items is Boolean, which need not be monotone or additive. Notably, we do not impose the standard assumption of normalization, i.e., different agents may value the empty set at different Boolean levels. Since the preferences are nonmonotone, envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) each admit several variants, depending on which items are tested for removal and whether they are removed from the envious agent's bundle or the envied agent's bundle. This paper investigates the existence of these variants of EF1 and EFX, on their own and together with economic efficiency, incentive compatibility, feasibility constraints, and lottery-based randomization. Our paper presents a wide range of positive and negative results that collectively highlight an interesting phenomenon: the landscape of achievable guarantees depends crucially on the number of normalized agents, who value the empty bundle at the lower Boolean level.

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v3 · 2026-11-19 02:48 · 最新观测版本

Fair Division Under Boolean Valuations: Beyond Normalization

We study fair division of indivisible items when agents have arbitrary two-level preferences: the value of each agent for any set of items is Boolean, which need not be monotone or additive. Notably, we do not impose the standard assumption of normalization, i.e., different agents may value the empty set at different Boolean levels. Since the preferences are nonmonotone, envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) each admit several variants, depending on which items are tested for removal and whether they are removed from the envious agent's bundle or the envied agent's bundle. This paper investigates the existence of these variants of EF1 and EFX, on their own and together with economic efficiency, incentive compatibility, feasibility constraints, and lottery-based randomization. Our paper presents a wide range of positive and negative results that collectively highlight an interesting phenomenon: the landscape of achievable guarantees depends crucially on the number of normalized agents, who value the empty bundle at the lower Boolean level.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗
v2 · 2026-11-17 06:49

Fair Division Under Boolean Valuations: Beyond Normalization

We study fair division of indivisible items when agents have arbitrary two-level preferences: the value of each agent for any set of items is Boolean, which need not be monotone or additive. Notably, we do not impose the standard assumption of normalization, i.e., different agents may value the empty set at different Boolean levels. Since the preferences are nonmonotone, envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) each admit several variants, depending on which items are tested for removal and whether they are removed from the envious agent's bundle or the envied agent's bundle. This paper investigates the existence of these variants of EF1 and EFX, on their own and together with economic efficiency, incentive compatibility, feasibility constraints, and lottery-based randomization. Our paper presents a wide range of positive and negative results that collectively highlight an interesting phenomenon: the landscape of achievable guarantees depends crucially on the number of normalized agents, who value the empty bundle at the lower Boolean level.

查看此版本解读 →查看此版本原文 ↗