← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2609.34074 · v2
The Double-Edged Sword of Information: Revealed versus Hidden Lotteries in School Choice
首次提交 2026-09-28 09:06
版本更新 2026-11-19 08:45
雷达观测 2026-11-20 10:50
摘要
In school choice, a lottery number is often used by the matching mechanism to break ties when more students prefer the same school than the number of seats available. In practice, in recent years, the NYC Public Schools started revealing the lottery number to students. Theoretical findings from prior literature suggest that revealing the lottery number strictly improves the number of matches under the deferred acceptance algorithm. However, these theoretical results are based on the over-simplifying assumption that all students share the same preference ranking for schools. In this work, we relax this assumption and allow students to have heterogeneous preference rankings. Under a game-theoretic model where student strategies form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we characterize scenarios where revealing the lottery number can either improve or worsen the matching outcome, measured by two metrics of the match rate and social welfare, when students submit preference lists of length one. We further consider revealing partial information about the lottery, and demonstrate non-monotonic effects in the amount of information available to students. From these theoretical results, we identify a mechanism through which lottery revealing deteriorates the overall matching quality: Under the revealed lottery, students with weak preferences but high priorities slightly improve their matching outcome at the cost of increasing congestion and substantially worsening the outcome of students with strong preferences. Using a mean-field approximation, we show via simulations that this mechanism continues to operate when the length of preference lists is greater than one. These theoretical and simulation results together illustrate complex tradeoffs induced by the lottery revealing policy, and we identify students' preference heterogeneity and preference intensity as two key factors in shaping these tradeoffs.
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v2 · 2026-11-19 08:45 · 最新观测版本
The Double-Edged Sword of Information: Revealed versus Hidden Lotteries in School Choice
In school choice, a lottery number is often used by the matching mechanism to break ties when more students prefer the same school than the number of seats available. In practice, in recent years, the NYC Public Schools started revealing the lottery number to students. Theoretical findings from prior literature suggest that revealing the lottery number strictly improves the number of matches under the deferred acceptance algorithm. However, these theoretical results are based on the over-simplifying assumption that all students share the same preference ranking for schools. In this work, we relax this assumption and allow students to have heterogeneous preference rankings. Under a game-theoretic model where student strategies form a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we characterize scenarios where revealing the lottery number can either improve or worsen the matching outcome, measured by two metrics of the match rate and social welfare, when students submit preference lists of length one. We further consider revealing partial information about the lottery, and demonstrate non-monotonic effects in the amount of information available to students. From these theoretical results, we identify a mechanism through which lottery revealing deteriorates the overall matching quality: Under the revealed lottery, students with weak preferences but high priorities slightly improve their matching outcome at the cost of increasing congestion and substantially worsening the outcome of students with strong preferences. Using a mean-field approximation, we show via simulations that this mechanism continues to operate when the length of preference lists is greater than one. These theoretical and simulation results together illustrate complex tradeoffs induced by the lottery revealing policy, and we identify students' preference heterogeneity and preference intensity as two key factors in shaping these tradeoffs.
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