← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2610.28141 · v3
Fixed Sets and the Hardness of Computing Correlated Equilibria
首次提交 2026-10-20 20:48
版本更新 2026-11-17 23:20
雷达观测 2026-11-18 16:38
摘要
We show that computing an approximate correlated equilibrium of a polytope game is PPAD-complete, and thus polynomial-time equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium. This challenges the conventional view in game theory that correlated equilibria are more tractable objects than Nash equilibria. From a conceptual standpoint, we connect correlated equilibria to a natural generalization of fixed points, which we call fixed sets. A fixed set of a continuous function is a nonempty finite set such that . Our main technical contribution is to prove that computing a fixed set is PPAD-hard even at inverse polynomial precision.
作者备注:The results of this manuscript have been incorporated into arXiv:2605.17665
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v3 · 2026-11-17 23:20 · 最新观测版本
Fixed Sets and the Hardness of Computing Correlated Equilibria
We show that computing an approximate correlated equilibrium of a polytope game is PPAD-complete, and thus polynomial-time equivalent to finding a Nash equilibrium. This challenges the conventional view in game theory that correlated equilibria are more tractable objects than Nash equilibria. From a conceptual standpoint, we connect correlated equilibria to a natural generalization of fixed points, which we call fixed sets. A fixed set of a continuous function is a nonempty finite set such that . Our main technical contribution is to prove that computing a fixed set is PPAD-hard even at inverse polynomial precision.
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