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arXiv:2611.19864 · v1

Local Order Matters: A Lightweight CPU-Trainable CNN for Website Fingerprinting on Defended Tor Traffic

首次提交 2026-11-15 16:07
版本更新 2026-11-15 16:07
雷达观测 2026-11-17 12:06
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摘要

Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks let a passive adversary infer which site a Tor user visits from the encrypted cell sequence. On undefended traffic, hand-crafted-feature attacks are already near-ceiling, so deep learning offers only a marginal advantage there. We show that the decisive regime is defended traffic: against the FRONT padding defense, which injects dummy cells that corrupt the volume and count features feature attacks rely on, a compact 95,103-parameter 1-D convolutional network trained on the raw cell-direction sequence, on CPU only, stays robust while three implemented direction-only feature baselines degrade. On the closed-world WFlib FRONT set (95 sites), our model reaches 54.2% top-1 accuracy versus 38.5% for the strongest implemented feature baseline (k-FP-style RF), a gain of 15.7 percentage points (3 seeds; seed-0 paired-bootstrap 95% CI [+14.5, +17.0] pp on per-trace correctness, excluding zero). On undefended traffic the CNN reaches 94.1% versus 92.3% for k-FP-style RF. A controlled order-ablation permutes only nonzero traffic cells within each trace, preserving direction counts, retained length, and trailing zero-padding positions while destroying traffic order. This collapses the CNN below every feature baseline (from 54.2% to 7.6%, a 46.6 pp drop), showing that the model depends strongly on order-derived information under FRONT.

作者备注:5 pages, 1 figure. Conference paper submitted to the 11th International Conference on Computer and Information Processing Technology (ISCIPT 2026)

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v1 · 2026-11-15 16:07 · 最新观测版本

Local Order Matters: A Lightweight CPU-Trainable CNN for Website Fingerprinting on Defended Tor Traffic

Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks let a passive adversary infer which site a Tor user visits from the encrypted cell sequence. On undefended traffic, hand-crafted-feature attacks are already near-ceiling, so deep learning offers only a marginal advantage there. We show that the decisive regime is defended traffic: against the FRONT padding defense, which injects dummy cells that corrupt the volume and count features feature attacks rely on, a compact 95,103-parameter 1-D convolutional network trained on the raw cell-direction sequence, on CPU only, stays robust while three implemented direction-only feature baselines degrade. On the closed-world WFlib FRONT set (95 sites), our model reaches 54.2% top-1 accuracy versus 38.5% for the strongest implemented feature baseline (k-FP-style RF), a gain of 15.7 percentage points (3 seeds; seed-0 paired-bootstrap 95% CI [+14.5, +17.0] pp on per-trace correctness, excluding zero). On undefended traffic the CNN reaches 94.1% versus 92.3% for k-FP-style RF. A controlled order-ablation permutes only nonzero traffic cells within each trace, preserving direction counts, retained length, and trailing zero-padding positions while destroying traffic order. This collapses the CNN below every feature baseline (from 54.2% to 7.6%, a 46.6 pp drop), showing that the model depends strongly on order-derived information under FRONT.

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