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arXiv:2611.21331 · v1

TRIAGE-CPG: A Cross-Model Study of Budgeted Static Malware Triage with Large Language Models

首次提交 2026-11-17 00:19
版本更新 2026-11-17 00:19
雷达观测 2026-11-17 16:10
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摘要

When triaging unknown binaries, security analysts must decide which samples to clear as benign, flag as malicious, or escalate for deeper analysis. Large Language Models (LLMs) could support these decisions by interpreting decompiled code, but a binary can contain hundreds or thousands of functions, making exhaustive LLM analysis impractical. We study how current LLMs behave when static triage is formulated as budgeted evidence acquisition: which functions they inspect and how they trade off benign clearance, malware detection, and escalation. To enable a controlled comparison, we implement TRIAGE-CPG, a fixed pipeline over a code property graph (CPG) of a decompiled binary. An LLM-free heuristic selects seed functions, an agent expands the resulting evidence dossier under a fixed budget, and a reporting stage produces a benign, suspicious, or malicious verdict together with a behavioral report. We evaluate eight closed-source and open-weight models on 1,000 Windows PE binaries, using a 600-sample test split and the same zero-shot protocol for every model. We assess the ternary verdicts under both a strict binary reading and triage balanced accuracy (tBA), which credits malware that is flagged or escalated and benign samples only when cleared. After analyzing about 40 of a mean 1,000 functions per binary, the highest-scoring model reaches a strict balanced accuracy of 0.805 and a tBA of 0.855, flagging 65% of malware, escalating another 12%, and clearing 94% of benign samples. The models implement different triage policies: high-specificity models produce small, malware-rich escalation queues, whereas recall-oriented models escalate or flag much more broadly. Both closed-source and open-weight models appear across this spectrum. Our results identify no universal deployment configuration: model choice itself determines the clear/flag/escalate trade-off under limited static evidence.

作者备注:Code and artifacts available here: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22771897

期刊信息:Proceedings of the 19th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security (AISec '26), Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 2026, pp. 339-351

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v1 · 2026-11-17 00:19 · 最新观测版本

TRIAGE-CPG: A Cross-Model Study of Budgeted Static Malware Triage with Large Language Models

When triaging unknown binaries, security analysts must decide which samples to clear as benign, flag as malicious, or escalate for deeper analysis. Large Language Models (LLMs) could support these decisions by interpreting decompiled code, but a binary can contain hundreds or thousands of functions, making exhaustive LLM analysis impractical. We study how current LLMs behave when static triage is formulated as budgeted evidence acquisition: which functions they inspect and how they trade off benign clearance, malware detection, and escalation. To enable a controlled comparison, we implement TRIAGE-CPG, a fixed pipeline over a code property graph (CPG) of a decompiled binary. An LLM-free heuristic selects seed functions, an agent expands the resulting evidence dossier under a fixed budget, and a reporting stage produces a benign, suspicious, or malicious verdict together with a behavioral report. We evaluate eight closed-source and open-weight models on 1,000 Windows PE binaries, using a 600-sample test split and the same zero-shot protocol for every model. We assess the ternary verdicts under both a strict binary reading and triage balanced accuracy (tBA), which credits malware that is flagged or escalated and benign samples only when cleared. After analyzing about 40 of a mean 1,000 functions per binary, the highest-scoring model reaches a strict balanced accuracy of 0.805 and a tBA of 0.855, flagging 65% of malware, escalating another 12%, and clearing 94% of benign samples. The models implement different triage policies: high-specificity models produce small, malware-rich escalation queues, whereas recall-oriented models escalate or flag much more broadly. Both closed-source and open-weight models appear across this spectrum. Our results identify no universal deployment configuration: model choice itself determines the clear/flag/escalate trade-off under limited static evidence.

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