← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.24994 · v1
What the model knows but does not say: monitoring medical LLMs through verbalized thoughts
首次提交 2026-11-18 22:15
版本更新 2026-11-18 22:15
雷达观测 2026-11-21 12:18
摘要
Efforts to keep clinical language models safe have concentrated on what enters and leaves the model, but a manipulated model can return an answer that looks entirely ordinary. Here we show that the model's own internal state, rendered in plain language, exposes manipulations the output conceals. Using a natural-language autoencoder, we translate the activations of a multimodal LLM (Gemma-3-27B) into text and let an input-blind judge read this verbalized internal state (the thoughts channel) and the model's answer separately. Across two clinical attack objectives (omitting a pathology, covertly recommending a drug), two input modalities, and two delivery mechanisms, the thoughts channel caught the injection significantly more often than the answer in all eight injected conditions (p<0.05), while both channels held near-zero false-positive rates on clean inputs; the omission result carried over to Llama-3.3-70B. The thoughts channel also registered unsafe clinical requests as harmful while the model was still reading them, before it decided whether to refuse. None of this requires retraining: an off-the-shelf verbalizer and a general-purpose judge are enough.
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v1 · 2026-11-18 22:15 · 最新观测版本
What the model knows but does not say: monitoring medical LLMs through verbalized thoughts
Efforts to keep clinical language models safe have concentrated on what enters and leaves the model, but a manipulated model can return an answer that looks entirely ordinary. Here we show that the model's own internal state, rendered in plain language, exposes manipulations the output conceals. Using a natural-language autoencoder, we translate the activations of a multimodal LLM (Gemma-3-27B) into text and let an input-blind judge read this verbalized internal state (the thoughts channel) and the model's answer separately. Across two clinical attack objectives (omitting a pathology, covertly recommending a drug), two input modalities, and two delivery mechanisms, the thoughts channel caught the injection significantly more often than the answer in all eight injected conditions (p<0.05), while both channels held near-zero false-positive rates on clean inputs; the omission result carried over to Llama-3.3-70B. The thoughts channel also registered unsafe clinical requests as harmful while the model was still reading them, before it decided whether to refuse. None of this requires retraining: an off-the-shelf verbalizer and a general-purpose judge are enough.
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