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arXiv:2611.26353 · v1

When Suspicion Adds Up: A Stochastic Framework for Optimizing Honeypot-Based Insider-Threat Detection

当怀疑累积时:优化蜜罐内鬼威胁检测的随机框架

首次提交 2026-11-20 00:24
版本更新 2026-11-20 00:24
雷达观测 2026-11-20 12:52
arXiv ↗PDF ↗

摘要

Insider threats pose security risks when employees or other trusted users misuse their access to organizational systems. Detecting these threats is difficult because harmful activity can resemble routine behavior. Honeypots, or decoy resources monitored for suspicious interactions, can provide evidence of potentially malicious activity. We develop a decision framework that models evidence accumulation through honeypot interactions using a continuous-time Markov chain and jointly selects honeypot counts and monitoring horizons to minimize expected losses from malicious activity and false detections. For thresholds of two and three interactions, we derive closed-form true- and false-detection probabilities and expected detection times conditional on detection within the monitoring horizon. We characterize boundary cases and establish stochastic-ordering results. Our numerical results highlight the value of the proposed framework across different settings.

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基于摘要 · 非全文审阅

作者提出一个基于连续时间马尔可夫链的决策框架,联合选择蜜罐数量与监控时长,以最小化恶意活动与误报带来的期望损失。

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v1 · 2026-11-20 00:24 · 最新观测版本

When Suspicion Adds Up: A Stochastic Framework for Optimizing Honeypot-Based Insider-Threat Detection

Insider threats pose security risks when employees or other trusted users misuse their access to organizational systems. Detecting these threats is difficult because harmful activity can resemble routine behavior. Honeypots, or decoy resources monitored for suspicious interactions, can provide evidence of potentially malicious activity. We develop a decision framework that models evidence accumulation through honeypot interactions using a continuous-time Markov chain and jointly selects honeypot counts and monitoring horizons to minimize expected losses from malicious activity and false detections. For thresholds of two and three interactions, we derive closed-form true- and false-detection probabilities and expected detection times conditional on detection within the monitoring horizon. We characterize boundary cases and establish stochastic-ordering results. Our numerical results highlight the value of the proposed framework across different settings.

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