arXiv:2608.06134 · v3

Large-Market Discipline in Combinatorial Double Auctions: No Recombination, Bundle Selection, and Complementarities

首次提交 2026-08-06 23:07

版本更新 2026-11-09 00:29

雷达观测 2026-11-10 12:16

摘要

Licences can forbid assembling bundles from several sellers or splitting them among buyers, a restriction we call No Recombination. We study its welfare cost in a double auction as the number of traders on each side of the market grows. We ask whether that cost vanishes as a share of welfare, as the gain from misreporting does with a single good. With two goods and Gaussian shocks, consider the prices that would prevail under free recombination. As the market grows, the loss as a share of optimal welfare vanishes if and only if expected demand for the two-good bundle equals expected supply of whole bundles at those prices. Otherwise the loss persists. In our market, sellers can never gain by misreporting. With two goods, buyers who commit to bidding their values plus fixed margins misreport in symmetric equilibria by amounts that vanish as the market grows. Under these conditions, in large markets No Recombination outweighs strategic bidding as a source of loss.

作者备注：107 pages, including a 55-page online appendix