← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.14858 · v1
The Price of Anarchy in Markets for Lemons
首次提交 2026-11-11 08:17
版本更新 2026-11-11 08:17
雷达观测 2026-11-13 10:09
摘要
We study the worst-case equilibrium gains from trade in simple bilateral trade mechanisms with interdependent valuations. Equilibria in such settings are typically complex, as proposed prices can convey private information held by the proposer. Such equilibria suffer lost gains from trade both due to the inefficiency introduced by screening (as in independent private value settings) and due to adverse selection. We identify broad conditions under which, nevertheless, sequential equilibria are guaranteed to achieve a constant fraction of the first-best gains from trade. Our bounds quantify the central role of rare pessimistic seller signals and rare optimistic buyer signals. The results apply to seller-proposer, buyer-proposer, and random-proposer mechanisms. The key idea in our analysis is to relate equilibrium gains from trade to proposer profits in an auxiliary market with independent private values.
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v1 · 2026-11-11 08:17 · 最新观测版本
The Price of Anarchy in Markets for Lemons
We study the worst-case equilibrium gains from trade in simple bilateral trade mechanisms with interdependent valuations. Equilibria in such settings are typically complex, as proposed prices can convey private information held by the proposer. Such equilibria suffer lost gains from trade both due to the inefficiency introduced by screening (as in independent private value settings) and due to adverse selection. We identify broad conditions under which, nevertheless, sequential equilibria are guaranteed to achieve a constant fraction of the first-best gains from trade. Our bounds quantify the central role of rare pessimistic seller signals and rare optimistic buyer signals. The results apply to seller-proposer, buyer-proposer, and random-proposer mechanisms. The key idea in our analysis is to relate equilibrium gains from trade to proposer profits in an auxiliary market with independent private values.
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