← 研踪 PaperTrailarXiv:2611.20204 · v1
Paying Creators for Training Data Can Increase AI Displacement
首次提交 2026-11-16 03:05
版本更新 2026-11-16 03:05
雷达观测 2026-11-17 12:06
摘要
Generative AI increasingly competes with creators while using their content as training data. In response, policymakers have called for platforms to compensate creators for training data use and allow opting out. We study how such policies affect creator displacement in a model of a platform where creators choose whether to contribute training data and consumers choose between purchasing from creators and prompting generative AI trained on their content. When compensation is required, the low-quality creator chooses to remain solely as a training data supplier while AI fully displaces her demand, despite AI quality and the price the platform charges for AI-generated content being identical with and without compensation. Without compensation, the risk of losing creators and their training data constrains the platform to set the price of creators' content to preserve their demand. This constraint also prevents further AI displacement as AI improves, with the platform raising AI prices while keeping creators' prices and demand unchanged to prevent exit. Compensation increases creators' payoffs and total surplus but reduces consumer surplus. Our findings highlight how compensation policies for training data can shape creators' economic roles in a future with more capable generative AI.
作者备注:53 pages, 6 figures. Previously circulated under the title "Platform Design When Creators Train Their AI Substitutes"
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v1 · 2026-11-16 03:05 · 最新观测版本
Paying Creators for Training Data Can Increase AI Displacement
Generative AI increasingly competes with creators while using their content as training data. In response, policymakers have called for platforms to compensate creators for training data use and allow opting out. We study how such policies affect creator displacement in a model of a platform where creators choose whether to contribute training data and consumers choose between purchasing from creators and prompting generative AI trained on their content. When compensation is required, the low-quality creator chooses to remain solely as a training data supplier while AI fully displaces her demand, despite AI quality and the price the platform charges for AI-generated content being identical with and without compensation. Without compensation, the risk of losing creators and their training data constrains the platform to set the price of creators' content to preserve their demand. This constraint also prevents further AI displacement as AI improves, with the platform raising AI prices while keeping creators' prices and demand unchanged to prevent exit. Compensation increases creators' payoffs and total surplus but reduces consumer surplus. Our findings highlight how compensation policies for training data can shape creators' economic roles in a future with more capable generative AI.
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